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Does income tax influence the motivation to work? We propose that the degree of effort exertion 
in the presence of income tax depends on people’s attitudes toward two key components of 
taxation: redistribution and government intervention. For people favorable toward both, working 
while taxed is aligned with personal identity and may actually enhance motivation. All others, 
however, may find taxes demotivating. In two incentive-compatible labor experiments, framing 
wages as subject to an income tax significantly increased productivity among people chronically 
favorable toward both redistribution and government intervention. For everyone else, taxes did 
not reliably influence productivity. An objectively equivalent intervention that did not 
redistribute a portion of participants’ wages (framed as a wage “match” rather than a “tax”) did 
not motivate anyone to work harder. Our findings suggest that the net effect of income tax on 
productivity partly depends on the distribution of attitudes toward redistribution and government 
intervention. 
 
Keywords: income tax, motivation, identity, productivity, redistribution 
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 Does income tax influence the motivation to work? The nature of this potential 
relationship is difficult to predict. For example, Dan Ariely (2011) noted several possibilities: 
“some people think that [raising income taxes] will cause the wealthy to stop working, others 
think that this will cause everyone to stop working, yet others think that as long as we care about 
how we do relative to others an increase of the tax rate will have no effect on effort and 
productivity.” A large body of research in macroeconomics has investigated this potential 
relationship, but has drawn somewhat conflicting conclusions (e.g., Keane, 2011; Saez, Slemrod, 
& Giertz, 2012). Limited experimental research on the influence of income tax on effort has also 
documented opposing effects, with Kessler and Norton (2016) finding negative effects of income 
tax on effort, and Djanali and Sheehan-Connor (2012) and Fochmann et al. (2013) surprisingly 
finding positive effects.  
 Reconciling mixed findings may hinge on a better understanding of the individual-level 
psychological effects of income tax. Many share the intuition that, as taxes increase, taxpayers’ 
motivation to work decreases (Srna, Zauberman, & Schrift, 2015). In fact, some people have 
publicly considered an extreme reaction termed “going Galt” (quitting their jobs in response to 
what feels like unjust taxation), inspired by Atlas Shrugged hero John Galt (Etheridge, 2009). 
Indeed, some prior work on sales and carbon taxes suggests that many people find taxes 
distressing (Sussman & Olivola, 2011; Hardisty, Johnson, & Weber, 2010; see also McCaffery & 
Baron, 2006). Income tax, in particular, has several properties that people find irritating. 
Although the U.S. federal income tax structure is progressive, many people feel that the rich do 
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not pay their fair share due to loopholes and other policies that favor the rich (Pew Research, 
2015). The tax code itself is complex and often misunderstood (e.g., Rees-Jones & Taubinsky, 
2016), producing frustration for many, particularly around the time that annual tax returns are 
due (Mulligan, 2010).  
 In addition to these factors, we propose that income tax has at its core two defining 
features that may or may not align with citizens’ own attitudes and thus may lead to different 
effects on their motivation to work. First, income tax is typically viewed as redistributive 
(Helderman, 2012). In reality, some U.S. federal tax revenues finance programs that primarily 
help people with lower income (e.g., Medicaid), and other tax revenues finance programs that are 
not explicitly redistributive (e.g., National Defense). Nevertheless, the perception of income tax 
as primarily redistributive persists. For example, when considering the public’s perception of 
income tax, Gordon Tullock (1971, p. 386), a founder of public choice theory, observed that the 
large amount of discussion around “the very minor phenomenon of redistribution from the 
wealthy to the poor” was “remarkable.” Consistent with this over-emphasis on the redistributive 
effects of income tax, a conservative millionaire named Norman Litz took out a full-page ad in 
the New York Times in 2012 to argue, among other things, that “paying taxes is a form of 
charitable giving” (Rosenman, 2012).  
We propose that the second defining feature of income tax is that it is a government 
intervention: It involves the government collecting a portion of taxpayers’ income and making 
decisions about how this money should be spent. While some government expenditures are 
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surely viewed as benign and necessary (e.g., fixing potholes), income tax is often viewed as a 
particularly “meddlesome” intervention (Lepore, 2012; Surowiecki, 2014). The lack of control 
over how one’s tax dollars are spent is a key driver of many citizens’ distaste for taxation 
(Lamberton, 2013).  
 It is worth emphasizing that, while redistribution can involve government intervention, 
the two activities are separable. It is entirely possible to have redistribution without government 
intervention (e.g., citizens choosing to donate some of their wealth to lower-wealth recipients) 
and government intervention without redistribution (e.g., collecting taxes to fund transportation 
infrastructure).1  
 Taxpayers likely vary in their feelings toward redistribution and government intervention. 
For example, while some people may be opposed to redistribution because they do not perceive 
much wealth inequality (Norton & Ariely, 2011) or because they believe that redistribution 
undermines upward mobility (Benabou & Ok, 2001), they might still believe that government 
intervention is generally positive. Conversely, some people may want to minimize government 
intervention, perhaps due to mistrust in government (e.g., Kuziemko et al., 2015) or 
philosophical objections, while engaging in redistributive efforts on their own terms (e.g., 
donating money). Others are likely to oppose both redistribution and government intervention, 
and still others are likely to favor both measures.  
                                                          
1 When income tax is progressive, it could be argued that using tax revenues to fund public goods is a form of 
redistribution (e.g., Boadway & Marchand, 1995). However, such expenditures are less prototypical examples of 
redistribution than expenditures that exclusively benefit lower-wealth citizens.  
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 These combinations of attitudes are unlikely to map perfectly onto political party 
affiliation. For example, Republicans differ in their support for redistributive policies (Matthews, 
2014). Kuziemko et al. (2015, table 2) found that self-identified conservatives were split almost 
equally when asked whether they support increasing income tax rates for millionaires (45% 
favored an increase, 55% did not). However, unlike political affiliation, the “Cultural Cognition 
Worldview” scale developed by Dan Kahan and colleagues (e.g., Kahan, 2012; Kahan, Jenkins-
Smith, & Braman, 2011) essentially measures individuals’ attitudes regarding the two central 
features of income tax. Despite its apparent relevance to income tax, the scale has previously 
been used to help explain people’s reactions toward other policy-relevant issues, such as climate 
change (Kahan et al., 2012), gun control, and nuclear power (Kahan et al., 2007). The scale 
assesses respondents’ attitudes toward social equality and redistribution (their level of 
“egalitarianism”) by asking them to rate their agreement with statements such as, “We need to 
dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and poor, whites and people of color, and men 
and women.” The scale assesses respondents’ attitudes toward government intervention (their 
level of “communitarianism”) by asking them to rate their agreement with statements such as, 
“The government should do more to advance society’s goals, even if that means limiting the 
freedom and choices of individuals.” These attitudes tend to be related (e.g., people who desire 
societal equality also tend to believe government should play a strong role in citizens’ lives), but 
they are far from perfectly correlated. In fact, Kahan (2012) noted that it is most appropriate to 
consider “four ways of life”: people who are high on both egalitarianism and communitarianism 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
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(which we will refer to as “High E / High C” types), high on egalitarianism and low on 
communitarianism (“High E / Low C”), low on egalitarianism and high on communitarianism 
(“Low E / High C”), and low on both egalitarianism and communitarianism (“Low E / Low C”).2 
 Kahan et al. (2007, p. 471) argued that these attitudes represent “highly salient 
commitments that are likely to shape individuals’ identities.” Attitudes are important components 
of identity (Hogg & Smith, 2007), and Oyserman (2009, p. 253) likens the stability of identities 
to the stability of attitudes. The potential identity-relevance of one’s attitudes toward social 
equality and government intervention may have implications for motivation. Prior work in 
psychology suggests that individuals possess multiple identities (e.g., “rugged individual” or 
“Midwesterner,” Oyserman 2009, p. 251), and identities that are made salient in a particular 
situation can influence cognition, motivation, and behavior (LeBoeuf, Shafir, & Bayuk, 2010; 
Reed et al., 2012). In particular, identity-based theories of motivation posit that the extent to 
which aspects of a task align with salient identities influences motivation (e.g., Oyserman, 2007, 
2009). This framework suggests that people experience a “motivational pull toward identity-
                                                          
2 Similar to Kahan’s perspective, others have also conceptualized political preferences as more nuanced than simply 
left/right or liberal/conservative. Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) developed a scale to measure five “moral 
foundations” that underlie political preferences: harm-avoidance (e.g., “It can never be right to kill a human being”), 
fairness (e.g., “Justice, fairness, and equality are the most important requirements for a society”), loyalty to the 
ingroup (e.g., “Loyalty to one’s group is more important than one’s individual concerns”), respect for authority (e.g., 
“If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer’s orders, I would obey anyway because that is my 
duty”), and purity (e.g., “People should not do things that are revolting to others, even if no one is harmed”). In an 
Amazon Mechanical Turk survey measuring egalitarianism, communitarianism, and these five moral foundations (N 
= 305), we found moderate relationships between egalitarianism and some of the foundations (e.g., egalitarianism 
scores correlated positively with fairness concerns, r(303) = .36, p < .001). The relationships between the 
foundations and communitarianism were generally weaker (see Appendix A for the full set of correlations).  
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congruent action” (Oyserman, 2009, p. 252) and are repelled by activities that conflict with 
salient identities.  
 From this perspective, the prospect of working in the presence of a salient income tax 
may be motivating to anyone high in egalitarianism (High E / High C types and High E / Low C 
types). In other words, egalitarians, who strongly desire greater societal equality, may find 
working in the presence of a salient income tax to be an identity-congruent, and thus motivating, 
experience. Alternatively, income tax may only be motivating to High E / High C types, who are 
favorable toward both central components of income tax. All others, who are unfavorable to at 
least one central component of income tax (redistribution and/or government intervention), may 
find working in the presence of a salient income tax to be identity-incongruent and, as a result, 
demotivating. Such a pattern would support our argument that income tax is spontaneously 
viewed as possessing two key features: it is redistributive, and it is a government intervention.  
 The notion that high levels of both egalitarianism and communitarianism may be needed 
to sustain motivation when income is taxed is broadly consistent with research aimed at 
understanding the predictors of tax avoidance (legally reducing one’s tax liability by seeking 
loopholes, deductions or perhaps by reducing one’s productivity at work) and tax evasion 
(illegally reducing one’s tax liability by under-reporting one’s taxable income). Several 
predictors of evasion have been identified (see Torgler, 2002 for a review), but one of the most 
prominent predictors is the perception that government is (in)competent (e.g., Alm & Torgler, 
2011; Gangl et al., 2013; Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Whal, 2008; van Dijke & Verboon, 2009). While 
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Kahan’s measure of communitarianism does not directly tap into perceptions of government 
competence, it is likely that people who favor strong government interventions also tend to view 
government as competent. Perceptions of the fairness of tax systems (e.g., the extent to which 
one’s tax burden is viewed as similar to the tax burden of comparable others; Kirchler et al., 
2008, 2014) also predict tax evasion. Kahan’s measure of egalitarianism does not directly tap 
into perceptions of the fairness of tax systems, but people who want to “dramatically reduce 
inequalities between the rich and poor” are likely to view (progressive) tax systems as fair. Thus, 
prior work on tax evasion and compliance further bolsters our expectation that egalitarianism and 
communitarianism are likely to influence the motivation to work when income is taxed.  
 Notably, our account for the consequences of income tax is not incompatible with any of 
the previously discussed findings (e.g., Djanali & Sheehan-Connor, 2012; Fochmann et al., 2013; 
Kessler & Norton, 2016). Our framework suggests that the net effect of income tax on the 
motivation to work will depend partly on the prevalence of different attitudes toward 
redistribution and government intervention in the taxed population. Aside from important 
differences in methods across past experiments, our reasoning suggests that differences in the 
distributions of these relevant attitudes across study populations may have played a role in 
producing the divergent results.  
 In what follows, we use incentive-compatible, real-effort laboratory experiments to 
examine the relationship between income tax, egalitarianism, communitarianism, and the 
motivation to work. We manipulate whether or not income earned in the lab is subject to a tax, 
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but we hold net wages constant across conditions. Thus, any influence of income tax on the 
motivation to work in our experiments cannot be explained by substitution effects (tax making 
leisure relatively more tempting) or income effects (tax producing a greater need to work to 
reach a desired earnings level). Instead, variation in the motivation to work can only be attributed 
to variation in psychological reactions to income tax, which we anticipate will be a function of 
the extent to which the task is experienced as identity-congruent. We do not exclude any 
participants or experimental conditions from our analyses, and we report all measures collected.  
 
Experiment 1 
 In Experiment 1, we investigated how attitudes toward redistribution and government 
intervention moderate the influence of income tax on the motivation to work. Income tax in our 
experiment was redistributive: We told some participants (truthfully) that their tax payments 
would be redistributed to other students (participating in different studies). We did this to create 
a perception that is common outside the laboratory – namely, that income tax revenues benefit 
other people (Helderman, 2012; Rosenman, 2012). The beneficiaries of tax revenue in our 
experiment were not impoverished, but we did specify that these participants were working 
without the opportunity to earn their own study compensation. We reasoned that High E / High C 
types would find working in the presence of income tax to be identity-congruent. As a result, we 
predicted that they would be more motivated to work when their wages were taxed than when 
their wages were not taxed. By contrast, all other participants are likely to find working in the 
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presence of income tax to be identity-incongruent. As a result, we predicted that they would be 
less motivated to work when their wages were taxed.  
 
Method 
 Undergraduates at a large, public Midwestern university (N = 233, 50% female, age 
range: 19-25, mean age: 20.3) participated as part of a course requirement for “Mkt 300” (an 
introductory marketing class). We told participants that they would have the opportunity to earn 
money by performing a counting task. In each round of the task, adapted from Abeler et al. 
(2011), participants had to count the number of zeros contained within a 10 × 15 matrix of zeros 
and ones. The task was quite tedious (see Appendix B for sample). Participants earned $0.20 for 
each acceptable response (within ± 1 of the correct number). Participants earned nothing for 
unacceptable responses. Participants could complete up to 20 rounds (the maximum number of 
possible rounds was not revealed in advance). Participants could also choose to stop at any time. 
Specifically, at the beginning of each round, before displaying the next matrix, we asked 
participants “Do you want to count zeros in [a/another] matrix?” Participants clicked Yes or No; 
if they clicked Yes, we displayed the next matrix, and if they clicked No, the task concluded (and 
then participants completed survey measures, described below). We implemented this feature 
(explicit continue-or-stop decisions) to disentangle disinterest in beginning or continuing the task 
from simple counting mistakes. Without an opportunity to opt out of the task, a disinterested 
participant may simply make a series of guesses, which would ultimately be coded as a set of 
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highly inaccurate responses. This experiment was conducted along with several other (unrelated) 
experiments (as part of a required session for students), so opting out of the task early meant 
moving on to the survey measures (described below) more quickly, as well as the next 
experiments, and thus being able to leave the lab session a few minutes early.  
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the Control condition, 
participants were simply paid $0.20 for each acceptable response. In the Tax condition, 
participants were initially paid $0.40 per acceptable response, but $0.20 in tax was immediately 
deducted. We (truthfully) told participants in the Tax condition (in the initial instructions) that 
“Your earnings will be subjected to a 50% tax. The money raised through this tax will go to non-
Mkt300 students who participate in different studies with different tasks that do not allow 
participants to earn money themselves. To reiterate, you will obtain half of your earnings for 
completing the task, because 50% will go towards the tax.” Importantly, note that our tax 
manipulation did not influence the net pay participants received for each acceptable response: In 
both conditions, participants personally earned $0.20 for each acceptable response. Thus, from a 
perfectly self-interested perspective, our manipulation should not influence participants’ 
motivation to work. At the conclusion of each round, we informed participants whether their 
response was acceptable by displaying a paycheck (see Appendix B for samples).  
 At the conclusion of the task, participants completed the short-form of the Cultural 
Cognition Worldview scale (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & Braman, 2011). The scale taps into the 
two central attitudes relevant to income tax (see Appendix B for the complete scale). The items 
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were scored such that higher scores on the two subscales reflected greater egalitarianism and 
greater communitarianism, respectively. The mean inter-item correlation within each subscale (a 
measure of internal consistency that is independent of the number of items in the scale) was .35 
and .19, respectively, both above the .15 threshold recommended by Clark and Watson (1995, p. 
316). Neither egalitarianism scores nor communitarianism scores differed by condition (both ps 
> .50). Egalitarianism and communitarianism scores were significantly correlated (r(231) = .32, 
p < .001; see Figure 1). Participants also indicated their political affiliation (Republican, 
Democrat, or Independent). We also administered some exploratory measures (listed in 
Appendix C), but we focus our analyses only on our central predictions.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Results and Discussion 
 We utilized total earnings as our measure of participants’ motivation to work. Total 
earnings are a function of the number of rounds attempted (i.e., the number of rounds where 
participants provided either an acceptable or unacceptable response) and precision (i.e., ability to 
approximately identify the correct number of zeros). Because there were generally few errors, 
total earnings correlated highly with the number of rounds attempted (r(231) = .94, p < .001).  
 A regression of total earnings on a Tax condition dummy (= 1 for Tax condition, = 0 for 
Control condition) revealed no main effect of our tax manipulation (p = .43; see Table 1, Model 
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1). To examine whether egalitarian and/or communitarian attitudes moderated the influence of 
our tax manipulation, we next regressed total earnings on Tax condition, egalitarianism scores, 
communitarianism scores (both mean-centered), and their interactions (Table 1, Model 2). 
Because egalitarianism and communitarianism were correlated, we examined whether there was 
a potential multicollinearity problem in the multiple regression by assessing the variance 
inflation factors of each coefficient (VIFs; Hair et al., 2006). The highest VIF (2.26) was less 
than the standard cutoff of 5 (Hair et al. 2006), so we concluded that multicollinearity was not a 
significant concern here. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 The regression revealed a significant Tax × egalitarianism interaction (p = .004). 
However, this two-way interaction was qualified by a significant Tax × egalitarianism × 
communitarianism interaction (p = .006). We performed a spotlight analysis to probe this three-
way interaction (Aiken & West, 1991). Specifically, we examined the influence of tax on total 
earnings at high and low levels of both egalitarianism and communitarianism (1 SD above and 
below their respective means; see Figure 2). Tax marginally reduced earnings among Low E / 
Low C types (p = .094), and significantly reduced earnings among Low E / High C types (p = 
.005). There was no effect among High E / Low C types (p = .45). Critically, among High E / 
High C types, tax significantly increased total earnings (p = .010).  
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INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 Follow-up analyses confirmed that the only significant difference between High E / High 
C types and other participants was in the Tax condition. When we focused on the Control 
condition only, and regressed total earnings on egalitarianism scores, communitarianism scores 
(both mean-centered), and their interaction, we found a marginal effect of egalitarianism (B = -
3.70, SE = 2.11, t(112) = 1.76, p = .081), no effect of communitarianism (p = .68), and, most 
importantly, no egalitarianism × communitarianism interaction (p = .38). This indicates that High 
E / High C types were not especially motivated or demotivated in the Control condition. 
However, when we focused on the Tax condition only, and regressed total earnings on 
egalitarianism scores, communitarianism scores (both mean-centered), and their interaction, we 
found an effect of egalitarianism (B = 5.39, SE = 2.24, t(113) = 2.41, p = .018), no effect of 
communitarianism (p = .20), and, most importantly, a significant egalitarianism × 
communitarianism interaction (B = 1.19, SE = .39, t(113) = 3.02, p = .003).  
 We also investigated whether cultural worldview scores were simply a proxy for political 
affiliation. In other words, in this sample, was High E / High C just another label for Democrat 
(or non-Republican)? This is important to investigate given that political affiliation moderates 
reactions to some other taxes (Hardisty, Johnson, & Weber, 2010; Sussman & Olivola, 2011). 
Certainly, political affiliation is correlated with one’s degree of egalitarianism and 
communitarianism. Both Democrats and Independents were significantly more egalitarian and 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
17 
 
communitarian than Republicans (ps < .01; Models 1 and 2 of Table 2). However, our 
subsequent analyses suggest that one’s degree of egalitarianism and communitarianism more 
precisely captures reactions to income tax than political affiliation. Specifically, Models 3-5 of 
Table 2 reveal that political affiliation did not come close to moderating the influence of income 
tax on earnings.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 Our analyses have treated total earnings as the sole dependent measure, but certainly 
other measures of the motivation to work could be constructed. For example, we could examine 
whether or not participants earned any money at all (21% of participants earned nothing). To 
explore this alternate measure, we conducted a logistic regression predicting a binary Earn 
Anything (or not) variable, utilizing the same independent variables from Table 1, Model 2. As 
in the analysis of total earnings, we found a significant Tax × egalitarianism × communitarianism 
interaction (p = .004). Spotlight analysis revealed that tax did not influence the probability of 
earning anything among Low E / Low C types (p = .51) and High E / Low C types (p = .11), and 
significantly reduced the probability of earning anything among Low E / High C types (p = 
.006). However, among High E / High C types, tax marginally increased the probability of 
earning anything (p = .079). 
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 Thus, Experiment 1 provides initial evidence that the effect of income tax on the 
motivation to work depends on one’s attitudes toward the central features of income tax 
(redistribution and government intervention). For those who are chronically opposed to either 
redistribution or government intervention, income tax has no consistent effect on motivation. For 
those who are chronically in favor of both redistribution and government intervention, working 
in the presence of income tax aligns with one’s identity and is motivating.  
 Additionally, Experiment 1 rules out the most obvious potential alternative explanation 
for our findings, namely that egalitarian and communitarian attitudes just capture the effects of 
political affiliation. We assessed the plausibility of another alternative account in a follow-up 
survey on Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 251, 59% female, average age: 34). We explored 
whether High E / High C types are simply people who reject the notion of a “just world” (i.e., a 
world where people get what they deserve and deserve what they get; Lerner, 1982). Benabou 
and Tirole (2006; cf. Frank, Wertenbroch, & Maddux, 2015) proposed that people who reject the 
notion of a just world are most likely to favor redistribution via income tax, because hard work is 
presumably not sufficient to raise the less fortunate out of poverty. However, when we regressed 
belief in a just world scale scores (measured with the Rubin & Peplau, 1975 scale; mean inter-
item correlation: .22) on mean-centered egalitarianism scores, mean-centered communitarianism 
scores, and their interaction, we found a significant relationship with egalitarianism (B = -.03, SE 
= .006, t(247) = 4.70, p < .001), no relationship with communitarianism (p = .14), and, most 
importantly, no interaction (p = .90).  
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 Another possibile alternative account is that High E / High C types are essentially “social 
surplus maximizers,” who are happy to generate as much money (for self and others) as possible 
when given the opportunity. That is, rather than experiencing the motivational benefits of 
identity-congruence while working in the presence of income tax, it is possible that High E / 
High C types were motivated by the opportunity to maximize the sum of money earned for 
themselves and for others. Theoretically, it is unclear why surplus-maximizers would happen to 
be strongly in favor of redistribution and government intervention, but based on Experiment 1 
alone, we cannot rule out the possibility that High E / High C types were primarily motivated by 
the opportunity to maximize social surplus. Experiment 2 explores this possibility.  
 
Experiment 2 
 To test the alternative hypothesis that High E / High C types are essentially social 
surplus-maximizers, we introduced a “Match” condition that allowed participants to generate 
money for themselves and others in the absence of taxation. In both the Match and Tax 
conditions, acceptable responses produce the same monetary outcomes for participants and other 
students. However, in the Match condition, the experimenter matches a portion of participants’ 
gross earnings with the experimenter’s money, and distributes the experimenter’s money to other 
people. In other words, Match participants have the same opportunity (as Tax participants) to 
generate revenue for other participants, but none of it comes out of their gross earnings. Thus, 
the Match condition essentially removes both the intervention component (we do not collect 
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money from participants) and the redistribution component (we do not redistribute collected 
funds to other participants). Our identity-congruence account predicts that the Match condition 
should not especially motivate High E / High C types. By contrast, the surplus-maximization 
account predicts that the Tax and Match conditions are equally likely to motivate High E / High 
C types. 
 In Experiment 2, we also examine the replicability of the basic Tax × egalitarianism × 
communitarianism interaction observed previously. We attempt to increase the generalizability 
of our findings by examining the effects of a different tax rate: 33% (rather than 50% in 
Experiment 1). Although both rates are high compared to average U.S. tax rates, they are 
comparable to average tax rates in some European countries (e.g., Denmark, Sweden). These tax 
rates are also comparable to rates utilized in prior experimental research (e.g., 50% in Kessler & 




 Undergraduates at a large, public Midwestern university (N = 358, 45% female, age 
range: 18-26, mean age: 19.9) participated as part of a course requirement for “Mkt 300” (an 
introductory marketing class). We told participants that they would have the opportunity to earn 
money by performing a counting task – the same task from Experiment 1. (None of the 
Experiment 2 participants had participated in Experiment 1.) All participants personally earned 
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$0.20 for each acceptable response (within ± 1 of the correct number), and nothing for 
unacceptable responses. Participants could complete up to 20 rounds, and they could choose to 
stop at any time.  
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. In the Control condition, 
participants were simply paid $0.20 for each acceptable response. In the Tax condition, 
participants were initially paid $0.30 per acceptable response, but $0.10 in tax was immediately 
deducted. As in Experiment 1, we told participants in the Tax condition (in the initial 
instructions) that their taxes would be redistributed to other students. Specifically, in the Tax 
condition, we told participants: 
 
Your earnings in this study will be subjected to a 33% tax. The money collected through 
this tax will go to non-Mkt300 students who participate in different studies with different 
tasks that do not allow participants to earn money themselves. To reiterate, you will 
obtain two thirds of your gross earnings for completing the task, because 33% will go 
towards the tax. 
 
In the Match condition, participants personally earned $0.20 for each acceptable response. In 
addition, for each acceptable response, the experimenter allocated $0.10 to other students. 
Specifically, in the Match condition, we told participants: 
 
A portion of your earnings in this study will be matched by a payment from us to other 
students. That is, every time you earn money, we will pay the equivalent of one half of 
your earnings to other students. These are non-Mkt300 students who participate in 
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different studies with different tasks that do not allow participants to earn money 
themselves. To clarify, this procedure will not reduce your earnings in any way. Instead, 
we will use our budget to make these additional payments.  
 
Thus, in every condition, participants personally earned $0.20 for each acceptable response. 
Also, in both the Tax and Match conditions, each acceptable response also produced $0.10 for 
other students. Critically, however, the Tax and Match conditions differ in how that $0.10 for 
other students is framed (as a tax or as matched revenue coming from the experimenter). At the 
conclusion of rounds in which the participant provided an acceptable response, we displayed 
animations illustrating their payments (see Appendix B). If participants provided an unacceptable 
response, we simply informed them of that fact (without animation).3   
 At the conclusion of the task, participants completed the short-form of the Cultural 
Cognition Worldview scale. The mean inter-item correlation was .42 for the egalitarianism 
dimension, and .23 for the communitarianism dimension. Neither egalitarianism scores nor 
communitarianism scores differed by condition (all ps > .15). Egalitarianism and 
communitarianism scores were significantly correlated (r(356) = .28, p < .001; see Figure 3). We 
also administered exploratory measures (listed in Appendix C), but we focus our analyses only 
on our central predictions.  
                                                          
3 Although correct responses produced identical monetary outcomes in the Tax and Match conditions, the 
percentage of gross wages allocated to other students necessarily differed between the conditions (33% in the Tax 
condition, 50% in the Match condition). This was not ideal, but ultimately unavoidable (either the amount of money 
or gross wage percentage allocated to other students must differ between Tax and Match conditions). However, the 
animation participants viewed after each acceptable response (Appendix B) emphasized amounts rather than 
percentages (showing one dime allocated to other students in both the Tax and Match conditions).  




INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Results and Discussion 
 A regression of total earnings on a Tax condition dummy (= 1 for Tax condition, = 0 
otherwise) and a Match condition dummy (= 1 for Match condition, = 0 otherwise) revealed no 
main effects our manipulations (ps > .25; see Table 3, Model 1). We next regressed total 
earnings on Tax condition, Match condition, egalitarianism scores, communitarianism scores 
(both mean-centered), and their interactions (Table 3, Model 2). The VIFs for the eleven 
independent variables were all in an acceptable range (from 1.38 to 3.29). We found a significant 
Tax × communitarianism interaction (p = .018). Critically, this two-way interaction was qualified 
by a significant Tax × egalitarianism × communitarianism interaction (p = .036). There was no 
Match × egalitarianism × communitarianism interaction (p = .69). We performed a spotlight 
analysis to probe both the Tax × egalitarianism × communitarianism interaction and the (non-
significant) Match × egalitarianism × communitarianism interaction. Specifically, we examined 
the influence of the Tax and Match treatments on total earnings at high and low levels of both 
egalitarianism and communitarianism (1 SD above and below their respective means; Figure 4). 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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 Relative to the Control condition, tax marginally reduced total earnings among Low E / 
Low C types (p = .087). There was no effect of tax among Low E / High C types (p = .48) or 
High E / Low C types (p = .12). However, among participants high in both egalitarianism and 
communitarianism, tax significantly increased total earnings relative to the Control condition (p 
= .009). By contrast, earnings in the Match condition did not significantly differ from earnings in 
the Control condition at any level of egalitarianism and communitarianism (all ps > .25). This 
suggests that High E / High C types are not simply motivated to maximize social surplus. Rather, 
they appear to experience the motivational benefits of identity-congruence while working in the 
presence of income tax. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
 Follow-up analyses confirmed that the only significant difference between High E / High 
C types and other participants was in the Tax condition. When we focused on the Control 
condition only, and regressed total earnings on egalitarianism scores, communitarianism scores 
(both mean-centered), and their interaction, we found no significant interaction (p = .35). 
Likewise, when we focused on the Match condition only, and regressed total earnings on 
egalitarianism scores, communitarianism scores (both mean-centered), and their interaction, we 
found no significant interaction (p = .18). This indicates that High E / High C types were not 
especially motivated or demotivated in either the Control or Match conditions. However, when 
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we focused on the Tax condition only, and regressed total earnings on egalitarianism scores, 
communitarianism scores (both mean-centered), and their interaction, we found a marginally 
significant interaction (B = .58, SE = .31, t(115) = 1.89, p = .061).  
 
General Discussion 
 Income tax is a salient presence in the lives of many employees. Whether or not 
employees routinely inspect the tax witholdings reported on their pay stub, the annual need to 
complete income tax returns and frequent political debates over income tax are likely to prompt 
employees to consider, from time to time, how income tax influences their take-home pay. Thus, 
it is important to consider how the presence of income tax influences individuals’ motivation to 
work. Intuition suggests that income tax is unlikely to bolster motivation (Srna, Zauberman, & 
Schrift, 2015). However, for some people, we found that the presence of income tax can actually 
enhance motivation and productivity. People whose identities are strongly tied to pro-
redistribution and pro-government beliefs worked significantly harder when taxed than when not 
taxed, presumably because working while taxed was identity-congruent for them (Oyserman, 
2009). We ruled out the possibility that these participants were simply social surplus maximizers 
by demonstrating that a wage “match” (objectively equivalent to our wage “tax”) did not 
motivate them to work harder.  
 Most participants in our samples were not favorable toward both redistribution and 
government intervention (Figures 1 and 3). Among these participants, income tax did not 
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consistently influence motivation and productivity. Thus, pooling across all participants, there 
was no main effect of the presence of income tax on productivity. Our results suggest that the net 
effect of income tax on productivity partly depends on the distribution of attitudes toward 
redistribution and government intervention in the relevant population. Our conceptual framework 
may help to explain why previous tax experiments that utilized different samples reached 
different conclusions about the net influence of income tax on motivation (e.g., Djanali & 
Sheehan-Connor, 2012; Fochmann et al., 2013; Kessler & Norton, 2016).  
One concern with our interpretation of the results is that, because egalitarianism and 
communitarianism are significantly correlated (r(231) = .32 in Experiment 1; r(356) = .28 in 
Experiment 2), the key Tax × egalitarianism × communitarianism interaction term may actually 
be capturing the interactive effect of Tax × egalitarianism2 or Tax × communitarianism2. We 
explored this possibility by running alternate versions of our key regression models (e.g., in 
experiment 1, replacing the egalitarianism × communitarianism and Tax × egalitarianism × 
communitarianism terms with egalitarianism2 and Tax × egalitarianism2 terms). All the alternate 
models yielded lower R2 values than the original models (.06 and .04 vs. .07 in Experiment 1; .03 
and .04 vs. .05 in Experiment 2). These results suggest that the key Tax × egalitarianism × 
communitarianism interaction term does not simply reflect the interactive effect of Tax and 
egalitarianism2 or Tax and communitarianism2. 
 The results support our argument that income tax is spontaneously viewed as possessing 
two key features: it is redistributive, and it is a government intervention. However, the explicitly 
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redistributive nature of our income tax may have inflated the relevance of the egalitarianism and 
communitarianism constructs. In other words, if the tax implemented in our experiments was not 
explicitly redistributive, we may have observed a weaker Tax × egalitarianism × 
communitarianism interaction. We cannot rule out this possibility based on our experiments. 
However, to partially address this concern, we utilized data that Dan Kahan generously shared 
with us. Kahan collected Cultural Cognition Worldview (short-form) scale responses and 
responses to other items over a six-year period (2007-2012) from a nationally representative 
sample. One dataset included a particularly relevant item. Specifically, in one sample (N = 
1,484), Kahan asked respondents, on a 1 (strongly oppose) to 6 (strongly favor) scale, “How 
strongly do you oppose or support eliminating the estate tax?” The estate tax (also known as the 
“death tax”) is highly progressive and redistributive, but unlike the tax in our experiments, the 
question did not emphasize that. We regressed the extent to which respondents favored 
eliminating the estate tax on mean-centered egalitarianism and communitarianism scores and 
their interaction. There was a significant main effect of egalitarianism (B = -.085, SE = .011, 
t(1,480) = 7.48, p < .001), a significant main effect of communitarianism (B = -.070, SE = .014, 
t(1,480) = 4.97, p < .001), and, most importantly, a significant egalitarianism × 
communitarianism interaction (B = -.008, SE = .003, t(1,480) = 2.27, p = .023). In line with our 
experimental results, spotlight analyses revealed that estimated favorability toward eliminating 
the estate tax among High E / High C respondents (4.07) was clearly lower than among Low E / 
Low C respondents (5.04), Low E / High C respondents (4.81), and High E / Low C respondents 
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(4.60). Thus, the correlational results derived from Kahan’s datasets help to mitigate the concern 
that the Tax × egalitarianism × communitarianism interaction observed in our experiments was 
an artifact of the way our income tax was framed.  
Other limitations should be acknowledged. As in previous experimental research 
examining the effects of tax on productivity (e.g., Kessler & Norton, 2016, left panel of Tables 1 
and 2), the R2 values in our regressions predicting productivity were low. Clearly, unobserved 
factors (e.g., perhaps the extent to which one’s egalitarianism and communitarianism are salient 
aspects of one’s identity, one’s tolerance for tedious tasks, one’s conscientiousness, and/or one’s 
need for money) also influenced productivity in our paradigm. Also, tax revenues in our 
paradigm were redistributed to other students at the participants’ university, and not to unknown 
others (as taxpayers often feel is the case). Taxes may be less motivating to High E / High C 
types when tax revenues are redistributed to completely unknown recipients. Finally, note that 
our experiments necessarily focused on the initial effects of introducing an income tax on 
motivation, rather than the long-run effects of income tax. It is unclear whether the routine, 
repeated payment of income tax has different effects on the motivation to work (or maybe even 
one’s level of egalitarianism and/or communitarianism).   
Our work raises several questions worthy of future research. For example, we proposed 
that the two central features of income tax are redistribution and government intervention, but 
arguably the “tax” label itself could also be considered a central feature (cf. Durham, Manly, & 
Ritsema, 2014; Eckel, Grossman, & Johnston, 2005; Hardisty, Johnson, & Weber, 2010). It 
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would be interesting to examine whether different labels for taxes (e.g., “dues”) produce effects 
on motivation similar to those observed here. Relatedly, one could compare a (no-tax) control 
condition to a “0% tax” condition; it is possible that the explicit absence of income tax may 
actually be demotivating to High E / High C types. To assess generalizability, future research 
could investigate how egalitarianism and communitarianism influence reactions toward 
progressive taxes. Our results, which relied on experiments that implemented flat taxes (i.e., tax 
rates did not depend on how much participants had already earned), may understate the extent to 
which people who are not High E / High C types find progressive income tax to be irritating. It is 
also worth examining how variance in the salience of income tax influences the motivation to 
work among different types of employees (cf. Chetty, Looney, & Kroft, 2009). Should income 
tax withholding be made even more salient (e.g., on pay stubs) in High E / High C populations? 
Could a high-stakes reminder of income tax (e.g., filing one’s annual tax return) reduce 
motivation among employees who are not favorable toward both redistribution and government 
intervention? The answers to these questions may have implications for tax policy and consumer 
welfare.  
Our work not only provides new reasons to consider the optimal framing and salience of 
income tax, but also raises questions about how egalitarian and communitarian attitudes develop 
in the first place. Given the necessity of taxing income, one implication of our work might be 
that society would be better off if it could find ways to enhance citizens’ levels of egalitarianism 
and communitarianism. Of course, beyond the domain of motivation and productivity, there may 
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be negative consequences of high levels of egalitarianism and communitarianism that we cannot 
observe here. Those broader implications, as well as the processes by which egalitarian and 
communitarian attitudes develop, are worthy of additional research.   
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Correlations between egalitarianism, communitarianism, and Graham, Haidt, and Nosek’s (2009) “moral foundations” 
  
Communitarianism Harm-Avoidance Fairness Loyalty to  Ingroup 
Respect for  
Authority Purity 
Egalitarianism .29** .30** .36**    -.29**    -.39**    -.36** 
Communitarianism  .21** .22** .11    .02       .12* 
Harm-Avoidance   .48**   .13*  .04        .17** 
Fairness    .05   -.00       .04    
Loyalty to Ingroup          .66**       .50** 
Respect for Authority          .56** 
 
Note: ** p < .01, * p < .05. Survey conducted via Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 305). 
 





















       Control condition      Tax condition 
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Short-Form of Cultural Cognition Worldview scale (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & Braman, 2011) 
 
Responses to each item were made on a six-point scale, ranging from Strongly Disagree to 
Strongly Agree. Responses were coded such that higher scores were indicative of higher 





1. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country. (reverse-scored)  
2. Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth was more equal.  
3. We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and the poor, whites and people 
of color, and men and women.  
4. Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in our society.  
5. It seems like blacks, women, homosexuals and other groups don't want equal rights, they want 
special rights just for them. (reverse-scored) 





1. The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives. (reverse-scored) 
2. Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep people from hurting themselves.  
3. It's not the government's business to try to protect people from themselves. (reverse-scored) 
4. The government should stop telling people how to live their lives. (reverse-scored) 
5. The government should do more to advance society's goals, even if that means limiting the 
freedom and choices of individuals.  
6. Government should put limits on the choices individuals can make so they don't get in the way 
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Experiment 2: Payment animations (for rounds in which the participant provided an acceptable 
response). Dashed arrows represent the movement that was displayed to participants. Participants 
in this experiment were part of a course (“Mkt300”), participating as part of a course 
requirement, and tax revenues / matched revenues were allocated to students not currently 












Exploratory measures collected at the conclusion of Experiment 1, listed in order of 
administration 
 
Four movie choices (e.g., Anger Management or Billy Madison), previously utilized as a 
measure of anger (Gal & Liu, 2011) 
 
How difficult did you find the earlier counting task? (1-7 scale) 
 
What do you think the purpose of the counting study was? (open-ended) 
 
 
Exploratory measures collected at the conclusion of Experiment 2, listed in order of 
administration 
 
How difficult did you find the counting task? (1-7 scale) 
 
Inclusion of other in the self scale (one item; Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992), referring to you and 
other students  
 
Self-report altruism scale (20 items; Rushton, Chrisjohn, & Fekken, 1981) 
 
How would you describe yourself politically? (Democrat / Republican / None of the above) 
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Table 1: Unstandardized Coefficients from Regressions Predicting Total Earnings, Experiment 1 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  B SE  B SE 
Intercept  85.69**   (8.07)   88.49**   (8.29) 
Tax condition  -8.94 (11.40)  -17.98 (11.68) 
Egalitarianism      -3.70   (1.99) 
Communitarianism       0.70   (1.58) 
Egalitarianism × Communitarianism      -0.33   (0.36) 
Tax × Egalitarianism       9.09**   (3.11) 
Tax × Communitarianism       1.44   (2.36) 
Tax × Egalitarianism × Communitarianism       1.52**   (0.55) 
       
N  233  233 
R2  .003  .071 
 
Note: ** p < .01. Tax condition is a dummy variable (1=Yes, 0=No).  
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DV (Models 3-5):  
Total Earnings 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Intercept 17.81** (0.44) 22.44** (0.54) 84.44** (10.29)  88.33** (10.29) 89.00** (13.81) 
Democrat    3.44** (0.58)   6.21** (0.70)   3.28 (16.70)     -1.27 (19.09) 
Independent    2.32** (0.63)   3.35** (0.76)       -9.58 (18.08) -10.25 (20.72) 
Tax condition      -5.66 (14.87) -17.58 (13.60) -24.17 (21.31) 
Tax × Democrat     -7.95 (23.32)   10.56 (27.88) 
Tax × Independent        28.56 (25.02) 35.15 (29.98) 
           
N 233 233 233 233 233 
R2 .133 .253 .003 .009 .010 
 
Note: ** p < .01. Democrat, Independent, and Tax condition are dummy variables (1=Yes, 0=No). 
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Table 3: Unstandardized Coefficients from Regressions Predicting Total Earnings, Experiment 2 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 B SE  B SE 
Intercept 61.35**   (7.07)  62.10**   (7.19) 
Tax condition  -3.53 (10.00)  -5.74 (10.08) 
Match condition  -10.68   (9.97)  -8.51 (10.35) 
Egalitarianism    -0.38   (1.29) 
Communitarianism    -3.00   (1.69) 
Egalitarianism × Communitarianism    -0.21   (0.21) 
Tax × Egalitarianism     2.95   (1.90) 
Tax × Communitarianism     6.05*   (2.55) 
Tax × Egalitarianism × Communitarianism     0.79*   (0.38) 
Match × Egalitarianism    -1.02   (1.81) 
Match × Communitarianism     2.83   (2.79) 
Match × Egalitarianism × Communitarianism    -0.14   (0.34) 
    
N 358  358 
R2 .003  .045 
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Figure 1: Heatmap displaying distribution of participants’ egalitarian and communitarian 
attitudes in Experiment 1 
 
Note: The darker the pixel, the greater number of participants who held those particular levels of 
egalitarianism and communitarianism. No color indicates that no participant held those particular 
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Figure 2: Spotlight analysis of total earnings (in cents), Experiment 1 
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Figure 3: Heatmap displaying distribution of participants’ egalitarian and communitarian 
attitudes in Experiment 2 
 
 
Note: The darker the pixel, the greater number of participants who held those particular levels of 
egalitarianism and communitarianism. No color indicates that no participant held those particular 
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Figure 4: Spotlight analysis of total earnings (in cents), Experiment 2 
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